A cause may influence its effect via multiple paths. Paradigmatically (Hesslow [1974]), taking birth control pills both decreases one’s risk of thrombosis by preventing pregnancy and increases it by producing a blood chemical. Building on Pearl ([2001]), I explicate the notion of a path-specific effect. Roughly, a path-specific effect of C on E via path P is the degree to which a change in C would change E were they to be transmitted only via P. Facts about such effects may (...) be gleaned from the structural equations commonly used to represent the causal relationships among variables. I contrast my analysis of the Hesslow case with those given by theorists of probabilistic causality, who mistakenly link it to issues of causal heterogeneity, token-causation and indeterminism. The reason probabilistic theories misdiagnose this case is that they pay inadequate attention to the structural relationships among variables. (shrink)

We examined effects of exposure to unreportable images of spiders on approach towards a tarantula. Pretests revealed awareness of the stimuli was at chance. Participants high or low on fear of spiders were randomly assigned to receive computer-generated exposure to unreportable pictures of spiders or outdoor scenes. They then engaged in a Behavioral Approach Task with a live tarantula. Non-fearful participants completed more BAT items than spider-fearful individuals. Additionally, as predicted, a significant interaction = 5.12, p < .03) between fear (...) of spiders and stimulus demonstrated that spider-fearful participants exposed to spiders completed more BAT items than spider-fearful participants exposed to control stimuli . The findings support the hypothesis that exposure to unreportable feared stimuli promotes approach towards the feared object. Future research and clinical implications were discussed. (shrink)

Knowledge is expressed in sentences about states of affairs of the type 'p' not in knowledge-sentences of the type 'W(p)'. Knowledge-sentences are results of a reflexion about a subject of knowledge and a knowledge-system. Objectivization of a knowledgesentence 'W(p)' is defined as the entailment of 'p' from the premis 'W(p)' based on the generally accepted sentence 'W(p)->p'. The author distinguishes three kinds of knowledge-sentences: a) self-reflective knowledge-sentences which are a result of the subject's S reflexion about his own knowledge 'WS*(p)';b) (...) comparative knowledge-sentences which are result of a reflexion of the subject S2 about the knowledge of another subject S1 using the knowledge of S2 as a criterion for judging S1's knowledge; c) the sentence of S2 about the believing of S1, that S1 knows p. In neither of these cases an objectivization is logically justified. (shrink)

Knowledge is expressed in sentences about states of affairs of the type 'p' not in knowledge-sentences of the type 'W(p)'. Knowledge-sentences are results of a reflexion about a subject of knowledge and a knowledge-system. Objectivization of a knowledgesentence 'W(p)' is defined as the entailment of 'p' from the premis 'W(p)' based on the generally accepted sentence 'W(p)->p'. The author distinguishes three kinds of knowledge-sentences: a) self-reflective knowledge-sentences which are a result of the subject's S reflexion about his own knowledge 'WS*(p)';b) (...) comparative knowledge-sentences which are result of a reflexion of the subject S2 about the knowledge of another subject S1 using the knowledge of S2 as a criterion for judging S1's knowledge; c) the sentence of S2 about the believing of S1, that S1 knows p. In neither of these cases an objectivization is logically justified. (shrink)

We report on the small-scale (0.5 13 h - 1M, a large-scale bias of ~2.0 and a satellite fraction of 12 ± 2 per cent. Thus, these galaxies occupy haloes with average masses in between those of the higher redshift BOSS CMASS sample and the original SDSS I/II luminous red galaxy sample © 2012 The Authors Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Astronomical Society © doi:10.1093/mnras/sts314.

_341_ _Objectives: _In patients with multivessel disease both the detection of the culprit lesion and the exact allocation are important preconditions for sufficient treatment and improved outcome. In a vessel based approach the combination of quantitative coronary angiography and fractional flow reserve measured by a pressure wire should be advantageous compared to myocardial SPECT, as morphological and functional information is delivered simultaneously. Therefore our aim was to evaluate MS in the detection and allocation of hemodynamically significant stenoses obtained by the (...) combined gold standard QCA plus FFR in patients with multivessel disease. _Methods: _FFR and QCA of 95 vessels in 80 patients have been evaluated. Hemodynamically significant target lesions were defined as intermediate stenoses between 50 and 75% with an FFR. (shrink)

For forty years, Harvey Mansfield has been worth reading. Whether plumbing the depths of MachiavelliOs Discourses or explaining what was at stake in Bill ClintonOs impeachment, MansfieldOs work in political philosophy and political science has set the standard. In Educating the Prince, twenty-one of his students, themselves distinguished scholars, try to live up to that standard. Their essays offer penetrating analyses of Machiavellianism, liberalism, and America., all of them informed by MansfieldOs own work. The volume also includes a bibliography of (...) MansfieldOs writings. (shrink)

Erratum to: Synthese 191:1925–1930 DOI:10.1007/s11229-013-0380-3 The authors were unaware that points in their article appeared in “Caveats for Causal Reasoning with Equilibrium Models,” by Denver Dash and Marek Druzdzel, published in S. Benferhat and P. Besnard : European Conferences on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty 2001, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 2143, pp. 192–203. The authors were unaware of this essay and would like to apologize to the authors for failing to cite their excellent work.

A generalization of Weinberg’s nonlinear quantum theory is used to model a reported violation of the predictions of orthodox quantum theory.

The Second Creation is a dramatic--and human--chronicle of scientific investigators at the last frontier of knowledge. Robert Crease and Charles Mann take the reader on a fascinating journey in search of "unification" with brilliant scientists such as Niels Bohr, Max Planck, Albert Einstein, Erwin Schrödinger, Richard Feynman, Murray Gell-Mann, Sheldon Glashow, Steven Weinberg, and many others. They provide the definitive and highly entertaining story of the development of modern physics, and the human story of the physicists who set out to (...) find the "theory of everything.". (shrink)

Since the atomic era began in 1945, there have been three waves of moral criticism directed at American nuclear weapons policies. The first wave, which began around 1957 and ended in 1962 with McNamara’s announcement of Flexible Response, focused on Dulles’s policy of Massive Retaliation. The second wave, which began in the early 70’s and ended in 1974 with Schlesinger’s announcement of Countervailing Response, focused on the Assured Destruction policy developed in McNamara’s later reports to Congress. The third wave began (...) in the 80’s with Weinberger’s remarks about “prevailing” in nuclear conflicts and may or may not end with the next MX vote or next strategic arms agreement. (shrink)

This is a remarkably well-written, accurate, and understanding survey of philosophy in the West from Augustine to Ockham. The author carefully traces the influence of Greek philosophy and of the three great religious traditions, Christianity, Judaism and Islam, on the great medieval scholastics. Prof. Weinberg's book is a real contribution toward a sympathetic grasp of a tradition which he tells us must be retained and reexamined incessantly if we are to learn from the past.—V. J. P.

In this paper, the structure of a southeastern Spanish population was studied for the first time with respect to its inbreeding patterns and its relationship with demographic and geographic factors. Data on consanguineous marriages from 1900 to 1969 were taken from ecclesiastic dispensations. Our results confirm that the patterns and trends of inbreeding in the study area are consistent with those previously observed in most non-Cantabrian Spanish populations. The rate of consanguineous marriages was apparently stable between 1900 and 1935 and (...) then sharply decreased since 1940, which coincides with industrialization in Spain. A marked departure from Hardy-Weinberg expectations in the ratio of first cousin to second cousin marriages in the study population was observed. The high levels of endogamy and its significant steadiness throughout the twentieth century is noteworthy. Accordingly, our results show that exogamous marriages were not only poorly represented but also that this reduced mobility suggests that the choice of a mate was preferentially local. We found higher mobility in M22 with respect to M33 cousin mating. The relationships between population size and consanguinity rates and inbreeding fit power-law distributions. A significant positive correlation was observed between inbreeding and elevation. Many Spanish populations have experienced a prolonged and considerable isolation across generations, which has led to high proportions of historical and local endogamy that is associated, in general, with high \ values. Thus, assessing genomic inbreeding using runs of homozygosity in current Spanish populations could be an additional pertinent strategy for obtaining a more refined perspective regarding the population history inferred from the extent and frequency of ROH regions. (shrink)

<P>Experimental philosophy is one of the most active and exciting areas in philosophy today. In <EM>Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy</EM>, Elizabeth O’Neill and Edouard Machery have brought together twelve leading philosophers to debate four topics central to recent research in experimental philosophy. The result is an important and enticing contribution to contemporary philosophy which thoroughly reframes traditional philosophical questions in light of experimental philosophers’ use of empirical research methods, and brings to light the lively debates within experimental philosophers’ intellectual community. (...) Two papers are dedicated to the following four topics:</P> <P></P> <UL> <LI>Language (Edouard Machery & Genoveva Martí)</LI> <LI>Consciousness (Brian Fala, Adam Arico, and Shaun Nicols & Justin Sytsma)</LI> <LI>Free Will and Responsibility (Joshua Knobe & Eddy Nahmias and Morgan Thompson)</LI> <LI>Epistemology and the Reliability of Intuitions (Kenneth Boyd and Jennifer Nagel & Joshua Alexander and Jonathan Weinberg).</LI></UL> <P></P> <P>Preliminary descriptions of each chapter, annotated bibliographies for each controversy, and a supplemental guide to further controversies in experimental philosophy (with bibliographies) help provide clearer and richer views of these live controversies for all readers.</P> <P></P> <P> </P>. (shrink)

How does it come about then, that great scientists such as Einstein, Schrödinger and De Broglie are nevertheless dissatisfied with the situation? Of course, all these objections are levelled not against the correctness of the formulae, but against their interpretation. [...] The lesson to be learned from what I have told of the origin of quantum mechanics is that probable refinements of mathematical methods will not suffice to produce a satisfactory theory, but that somewhere in our doctrine is hidden a (...) concept, unjustified by experience, which we must eliminate to open up the road. (Born [ 1954 ], pp. 8, 11) It is truly surprising how little difference all this makes. Most physicists use quantum mechanics every day in their working lives without needing to worry about the fundamental problem of its interpretation. (Weinberg [ 1992 ], p. 66) I endorse the view that it may be of no relevance to the acceptability of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics as a physical theory whether or not an informed observer can be uncertain about the outcome of a quantum measurement prior to its having occurred. However, I suggest that the very possibility of post-measurement, pre-observation uncertainty has an essential role to play in both confirmation theory and decision theory in a branching universe. This is supported by arguments which do not appeal to van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle. (shrink)

So far the "Science Wars" have generated far more heat than light. Combatants from one or the other of what C. P. Snow famously called "the two cultures" (science versus the arts and humanities) have launched bitter attacks but have seldom engaged in constructive dialogue about the central issues. In The One Culture?, Jay A. Labinger and Harry Collins have gathered together some of the world's foremost scientists and sociologists of science to exchange opinions and ideas rather than insults. The (...) contributors find surprising areas of broad agreement in a genuine conversation about science, its legitimacy and authority as a means of understanding the world, and whether science studies undermines the practice and findings of science and scientists. The One Culture? is organized into three parts. The first consists of position papers written by scientists and sociologists of science, which were distributed to all the participants. The second presents commentaries on these papers, drawing out and discussing their central themes and arguments. In the third section, participants respond to these critiques, offering defenses, clarifications, and modifications of their positions. Who can legitimately speak about science? What is the proper role of scientific knowledge? How should scientists interact with the rest of society in decision making? Because science occupies such a central position in the world today, such questions are vitally important. Although there are no simple solutions, The One Culture? does show the reader exactly what is at stake in the Science Wars, and provides a valuable framework for how to go about seeking the answers we so urgently need. Contributors include: Constance K. Barsky, Jean Bricmont, Harry Collins, Peter Dear, Jane Gregory, Jay A. Labinger, Michael Lynch, N. David Mermin, Steve Miller, Trevor Pinch, Peter R. Saulson, Steven Shapin, Alan Sokal, Steven Weinberg, Kenneth G. Wilson. (shrink)

Let M be a smooth, compact manifold of dimension n ≥ 5 and sectional curvature | K | ≤ 1. Let Met (M) = Riem(M)/Diff(M) be the space of Riemannian metrics on M modulo isometries. Nabutovsky and Weinberger studied the connected components of sublevel sets (and local minima) for certain functions on Met (M) such as the diameter. They showed that for every Turing machine T e , e ∈ ω, there is a sequence (uniformly effective in e) of (...) homology n-spheres {P k e } k ∈ ω which are also hypersurfaces, such that P k e is diffeomorphic to the standard n-sphere S n (denoted P k e ≈ diff S n ) iff T e halts on input k, and in this case the connected sum N k e =M ♯ P k e ≈ diff M , so N k e ∈ Met(M), and N k e is associated with a local minimum of the diameter function on Met(M) whose depth is roughly equal to the settling time σ e (k) of T e on inputs y i } ∈ ω of c.e. sets so that for all i the settling time of the associated Turing machine for A i dominates that for A i + 1 , even when the latter is composed with an arbitrary computable function. From this, Nabutovsky and Weinberger showed that the basins exhibit a "fractal" like behavior with extremely big basins, and very much smaller basins coming off them, and so on. This reveals what Nabutovsky and Weinberger describe in their paper on fractals as "the astonishing richness of the space of Riemannian metrics on a smooth manifold, up to reparametrization." From the point of view of logic and computability, the Nabutovsky-Weinberger results are especially interesting because: (1) they use c.e. sets to prove structural complexity of the geometry and topology, not merely undecidability results as in the word problem for groups, Hilbert's Tenth Problem, or most other applications; (2) they use nontrivial information about c.e. sets, the Soare sequence {A i } i ∈ ω above, not merely G öodel's c.e. noncomputable set K of the 1930's; and (3) without using computability theory there is no known proof that local minima exist even for simple manifolds like the torus T 5 (see §). (shrink)

In this paper we propose to argue for two claims. The first is that a sizeable group of epistemological projects – a group which includes much of what has been done in epistemology in the analytic tradition – would be seriously undermined if one or more of a cluster of empirical hypotheses about epistemic intuitions turns out to be true. The basis for this claim will be set out in Section 2. The second claim is that, while the jury is (...) still out, there is now a substantial body of evidence suggesting that some of those empirical hypotheses are true. Much of this evidence derives from an ongoing series of experimental studies of epistemic intuitions that we have been conducting. A preliminary report on these studies will be presented in Section 3. In light of these studies, we think it is incumbent on those who pursue the epistemological projects in question to either explain why the truth of the hypotheses does not undermine their projects, or to say why, in light of the evidence we will present, they nonetheless assume that the hypotheses are false. In Section 4, which is devoted to Objections and Replies, we’ll consider some of the ways in which defenders of the projects we are criticizing might reply to our challenge. Our goal, in all of this, is not to offer a conclusive argument demonstrating that the epistemological projects we will be criticizing are untenable. Rather, our aim is to shift the burden of argument. (shrink)

Drawing the complex terrain of the theories of induction and of the various ways to ground inductive knowledge in the middle ages is the aim of this paper. There have already been two excellent attempts to draw this terrain. The first is by Julius R. Weinberg and the second by E. P. Bos. My attempt differs from theirs in two major respects. The first is that it is more detailed in the examination of the various theories and their relations. The (...) second is that I focus on the role of natural necessities in induction. In particular, I try to place the various conceptions of induction within a network of issues that relate to the problem of universals, natural necessities and a power-based approach to activity in nature. Here is the road map. Section 2 explains Aristotle’s views of induction, as this were mainly developed in Posterior Analytics Book II.19 and states what I take it to be the main dilemma of induction, as this was described by Sextus Empiricus: induction is either perfect and impossible or imperfect and unjustified. In section 3, I move to Thomas Aquinas and his own attempt to justify induction and the actuality of general and necessary principles based on experience by an appeal to the natural light of reason. In section 4 I discuss John Duns Scotus’s reliance on a self-evident maxim to bridge the gap between imperfect and perfect induction. Section 5 moves to William of Ockham ’s peculiar attempt to justify single-instance inductions. Then, section 6 offers a detailed account of Jean Buridan’s ground-breaking re-conceptualisation of induction and the role of intellect in it. Section 7 discusses the critique of induction by Nicolaus of Autrecourt. Finally, section 8 offers a brief account of Pseudo-Scotus’s move from knowledge to opinion. (shrink)

Shelley Weinberg argues that the idea of consciousness as a form of non-evaluative self-awareness helps solve some of the thorniest issues in Locke's philosophy: in his philosophical psychology, and his theories of knowledge, personal identity, and moral agency. The model of consciousness set forth here binds these key issues with a common thread.

In this work we review the derivation of Dirac and Weinberg equations based on a “principle of indistinguishability” for the (j,0) and (0,j) irreducible representations (irreps) of the homogeneous Lorentz group (HLG). We generalize this principle and explore its consequences for other irreps containing j≥1. We rederive Ahluwalia–Kirchbach equation using this principle and conclude that it yields $\mathcal{O}(p^{2j} )$ equations of motion for any representation containing spin j and lower spins. We also use the obtained generators of the HLG for (...) a given representation to explore the possibility of the existence of first order equations for that representation. We show that, except for j= $ - \frac{1}{2}$ , there exists no Dirac-like equation for the (j,0)⊕(0,j) representation nor for the ( $ - \frac{1}{2}$ , $ - \frac{1}{2}$ ) representation. We rederive Kemmer–Duffin–Petieau (KDP) equation for the (1,0)⊕( $ - \frac{1}{2}$ , $ - \frac{1}{2}$ )⊕(0,1) representation by this method and show that the (1, $ - \frac{1}{2}$ )⊕( $ - \frac{1}{2}$ ,1) representation satisfies a Dirac-like equation which describes a multiplet of $j = \frac{3}{2}{\text{ and }}j = \frac{1}{2}$ with masses m and m/2, respectively. (shrink)

Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers' reliance on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense: philosophers are highly-trained experts, whereas the subjects in the experimental philosophy studies have generally been ordinary undergraduates, and so there's no reason to think philosophers will make the same mistakes. But this deploys a substantive empirical claim, that philosophers' training indeed inculcates sufficient protection from such mistakes. We canvass the psychological literature on expertise, which indicates that people (...) are not generally very good at reckoning who will develop expertise under what circumstances. We consider three promising hypotheses concerning what philosophical expertise might consist in: (i) better conceptual schemata; (ii) mastery of entrenched theories; and (iii) general practical know-how with the entertaining of hypotheticals. On inspection, none seem to provide us with good reason to endorse this key empirical premise of the expertise defense. (shrink)